Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Meaning: Differs from the reference object (reference). The object does not have to exist for an expression to have a meaning. Words are not related to objects in a one-to-one correspondence. There is an important distinction between word meaning and sentence meaning. See also use theory, sentence meaning, reference, truth, meaning theory._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. E. M. Anscombe on Meaning - Dictionary of Arguments
I 78 Meaning/"I"/Anscombe: the question of the meaning must be asked when it is asked what self-consciousness is. What is the meaning of "self" in self-consciousness? >Self, >Self-consciousness. This can be a commonality between the proper names and the "I": for the use of a name of objects is necessarily connected with a concept (conception) of this object. >Concepts, >Names, >Objects, >Naming. Syntactic structures of proper names: Problem: one cannot simply transfer them to "I": otherwise self-consciousness results as self-consciousness "of" something, precisely from a self. This could not capture the error security against false identification! >I, >Incorrigibility, >Misidentification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank, Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27